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ADOPTING THE FAMILY TAXABLE UNIT
Stephanie Hoffer*
In recent years, scholars have suggested that population stability
plays an important role in countries' economic health. In light of that
assertion, and with an eye toward declining birthrates abroad, this
Article asks how the United States, through tax policy, might aid
maintenance of a stable population level. Specifically, the Article
recommends use of the family taxable unit as a means of reducing the
effects of time and wage pressure on larger families. Use of the family
taxable unit would, unlike some other tax provisions, bring conceptual
coherence to the tax treatment offamilies while remaining neutral with
regard to the labor market participation of secondary earners.
* Visiting Assistant Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. Many thanks to Philip
Postlewaite, Daniel Shaviro, Charlotte Crane, Nancy Staudt, and Adam Rosenzweig for their comments
on earlier versions of the paper. Errors, of course, are wholly my own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. A Birthrate Backgrounder
Demographers have sounded the alarm. The world has embarked
upon the greatest demographic change in human history.' As a
consequence, many European nations will experience population decline
in the early part of this century. 2 The total fertility rate in Russia, for
instance, is only 1.14 children per woman, and in Japan, it is only 1.3
children per woman. 3 These numbers are significant not only because
they indicate a current failure to replace population but also because
mothers of the next generation will come from the current one. This
decade's thinned cohort of potential mothers could cause some countries
to experience exponential population decline in subsequent generations.4
Declining birthrates are cause for economic concern. Capitalism has
flourished only in conjunction with population growth, and it is now
flagging in Europe and Japan where the population has become
stagnant. 5 The strong correlation observed between population growth
and economic growth suggests that nations whose numbers dwindle
must look for novel ways to sustain their economies. 6 For instance, one
report estimates that social benefits promised by the world's developed
nations to retirees "cannot be measured-and are at least in the
1. BEN J. WATTENBERG, FEWER: HOW THE NEW DEMOGRAPHY OF DEPOPULATION WILL
SHAPE OUR FUTURE 1 *2004).
2. LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF & SCOTT BURNS, THE COMING GENERATIONAL STORM: WHAT
YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT AMERICA'S ECONOMIC FUTURE 3 (2004).
3. WATrENBERG, supra note 1, at 127. Total fertility rate, roughly speaking, is the number of
children per woman in a particular country. Technically, it is defined as the average number of children
that a birth cohort of women would having during their lifetimes if they survived their childbearing
years and had children at the age-specific birthrates applicable to the period in question. See U.N. DEP'T
OF ECON. AND SOC. AFFAIRS, POPULATION Div., WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS: THE 2004 REVISION,
VOL. III, at 34, U.N. Doc ST/ESA/SER.A/246 (2006), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/WPP2004/WPP2004_Vol3_Final/WPP2004_Analytical-Report.pdf [hereinafter UNITED
NATIONS].
4. WATTENBERG, supra note 1, at 112.
5. PHILLIP LONGMAN, EMPTY CRADLE: HOW FALLING BIRTHRATES THREATEN WORLD
PROSPERITY AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 4 (2004).
6. WATTENBERG, supra note 1, at 116 (suggesting that pay-as-you go retirement benefits will
result in economic disarray in countries facing depopulation).
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quadrillions of dollars.",7  As a result, countries like Italy and Japan,
where nearly half of the population will be older than age 65 by 2050,
are facing significant economic challenges.8  Absent technological
advance, the failure of developed and developing nations to maintain a
stable population level may decrease worldwide productivity and
ultimately result in economic collapse.
9
But what of the United States? In 2006, the country's population
reached 300 million. 10  The event was widely celebrated as a
counterpoint to declining birthrates in other parts of the world."
Nonetheless, stories about the event, when read closely, reveal its
tenuousness. 12  United States population growth, as it was reported,
depended not only on the birthrate of its immigrants but also on
decreased mortality rates among infants and the elderly.' 3  Despite the
rosy picture painted by the Census Report, fertility trends in the United
States, when viewed in ethnic and geographic terms, show that a
significant portion of the country has already followed in Europe's
footsteps. 14 The currently robust population figures can be traced to two
sources: the baby boom and immigration. The baby boom was a
singular event, an anomaly that reversed a 150-year decline in United
States fertility rates. 15  Setting that anomaly aside, American growth
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Technology might surprise us. It ranges from the cheerful to the macabre. For instance,
robots like Honda's Asimo might stand in for workers. Or, as Stanley Kurtz has laughably suggested, a
"eugenic regime" of crazed scientists might "spell the definitive end of the nuclear family" through
creation of "artificial wombs." See Stanley Kurtz, Demographics and the Culture War, 129 POL'Y REV.
33, 44-45, (2005), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3431156.html.
10. The United States: 300 Million and Growing, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2006, at A7.
11. See Marcus Walker, Population Control: In Estonia, Paying Women to Have Babies is
Paying Off, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2006, at Al. See also June Kronholz, Immigration's Latest Debate: Is
U.S. Big Enough?, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2006, at A5.
12. To put the question into perspective, consider Pittsburgh, a traditional blue-collar city.
According to the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, it will lose a full tenth of its labor force over the next
seven years. Eduardo Porter, Coming Soon: The Vanishing Work Force, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2004,
§ 3, at 1, available at 2004 WLNR 5511490. Half of its electric workers and at least 6,500 of its nurses
will reach retirement age over that period, leaving the city with a shortage of qualified laborers, but
nothing so dramatic as the shortage that is expected in Japan. Id.
13. See Stephen Moore, Supply Side: 300,000,000, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3, 2006, at A26; The
United States: 300 Million and Growing, supra note 10.
14. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 16. See also BRADY E. HAMILTON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIRTHS: PRELIMINARY DATA FOR 2003 2 tbl. A (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr53/nvsr53_09.pdf (showing that in 2003, only mothers of
Hispanic ethnicity had a TFR in excess of the replacement rate, while Native American women had a
TFR of 1.72, Caucasian women 1.86, Asian women 1.87, and Black women 1.87).
15. HERBERT S. KLEIN, A POPULATION HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 175(2004).
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comes principally from immigration.' 6  Today's fertility rates among
native-born women (including first generation Americans) are
substantially below even the lowest levels of the Great Depression. '
7
Whether America's role as the world's melting pot will keep it safe
from demographic concerns is far from clear. Among immigrants,
women of Hispanic origin have the most children, and of those, women
of Mexican origin are likely to have the largest families.' 8 But the total
fertility rate (TFR) in Mexico itself has fallen to the bare replacement
rate as women have become more educated.' 9 Demographers have
observed similar trends in other developing countries.20  As the fertility
rate drops in immigrant-sending nations, America can expect its newest
residents to have fewer children.2' At the same time, the number of
United States retirees is expected to double by 2030, but the entry of
new workers will not keep pace.22
2. A Demographic Dilemma
Ben Wattenberg has called the phenomenon described above as "The
Graybe Boom., 23  Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Bums have called it
"the greatest demographic change in human history. In less than a
century, the United States will move from being 'forever young' to
'forever old.', 24  The retirement of the baby boom generation over the
next thirty years marks the turning point.25 While there were only 35.5
16. WATTENBERG, supra note 1, at 121. This is a financial boon, because the average immigrant
contributes $80,000 more in taxes than she receives in government services over the course of a lifetime.
Id. at 192. See also The United States: 300 Million and Growing, supra note 10 (stating that "Jeffrey
Passell, a demographer from the Pew Hispanic Center estimates that immigrants and their U.S.-bom
offspring made up 55% of the last 100 million people in the U.S."); Kronholz, supra note 11 (stating
that immigration is expected to account for almost all public school growth over the next decade and
that the United States fertility rate "has been falling for decades and now is less than two. But
Hispanics, who account for more than half of all immigrants and 80% of illegal immigrants, average
almost three babies per woman. As a result, 20% of children under age five in the U.S. are Hispanic."
Id.
17. KLEIN, supra note 15, at 236; LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 16. For more information on the
decline in birthrates during the Great Depression, and the positive effect of subsequent economic
stability, see Price V. Fishback, Michael R. Haines & Shawn Kantor, Births, Deaths, and New Deal
Relief During the Great Depression (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11246, 2005),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1246.
18. WATrENBERG, supra note 1, at 65.
19. Id. at 74-75.
20. Id. at 155.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 6.
23. WATTENBERG, supra note I, at 115.
24. KOTLIKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2, at 1.
25. Id.
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million people age 65 and older in the United States in 2000, there will
be 69.4 million of them in 2030.26 In addition, life expectancy in the
United States has risen to a record 77.6 years.27 These numbers are
significant because caring for elderly citizens is expensive. Individuals
of age 65 and older receive eleven times more federal spending per
capita than children under the age of 18.28 Social Security and Medicare
make up the bulk of these expenses. 29  In 1950, the ratio of workers to
Social Security beneficiaries was over 16:1.30 In 2030, it will be 2:1.31
And by 2080, the number of elderly dependents in the United States is
projected to reach 60% of the population.32
Authors predict that the growing ratio of retirees to workers will
negatively impact the economy. 33  Increased Social Security and
Medicare costs will be reflected in "higher taxes, heavy government
borrowing, inflation, and interest rates that produce a negative real
return." 34 Why? Daniel Shaviro has estimated that the fiscal gap is $73
trillion but that only a small fraction of that gap represents current
government borrowing. 35  This may mean that Americans can expect
26. Id. at 6. This phenomenon is by no means confined to the United States. According to the
United Nations, the number of people over the age of sixty-five will triple from 476 million in 2005 to
almost 1.5 billion in 2005. UNITED NATIONS, supra note 3, at 27.
27. Americans' Life Expectancy Reaches a Record 77.6 Years, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar.
1, 2005, at A05, available at 2005 WLNR 3152041. Scientists predict that it may soon be common for
people to live over 100 years. The National Journal notes that:
[t]he race for the three-figure obit has already begun. This spring, a high-profile research
team called LifeQuest Expedition, partly sponsored by the U.S. government, will travel to
"longevity hot spots" around the world-places like Okinawa, Japan, and the Italian
island of Sardinia, where unusually large numbers of people live past 100. The LifeQuest
team will collect data about how these people become such "successful agers," and will
report back to the American public.
William Powers, The Immortality Race, 37 NAT. J. 7 (2005), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/
doc/prem/200502u/nj powers_2005-02-15.
28. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 38.
29. Id.
30. KOTLIKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2, at 4-5.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 6. This paper does not call into question the expenses themselves-over two-thirds of
older Americans get at least 50% of their income from Social Security and the bulk of their health needs
from Medicare. Id. at 203. Rather, it focuses on a family-friendly measure that could mitigate the
difficulty of meeting these needs by, if stated crassly, contributing to an increase in the number of
available taxpayers.
33. Id. at 8; LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 18. In fact, Kotlikoff and Bums have gone so far as to
say that "unless we act soon, the Greatest Generation will be the last to leave its children and
grandchildren a better country." KOTLIKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2, at 224. See also UNITED
NATIONS, supra note 3, at 26 (noting that changes in population age may translate into economic
changes).
34. KOTLiKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2, at 190.
35. Daniel N. Shaviro, Reckless Disregard: The Bush Administration's Policy of Cutting Taxes
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tens of trillions of dollars of future taxes and future borrowing.
Furthermore, economic growth cannot close the gap.36 Both taxes and
government outlays are pegged to growth, so as tax revenues increase,
so do outlays.
37
How will the distribution of this burden play out for taxpayers?
Jagadeesh Gokhale and Kent Smetters, in a report originally
commissioned for the President's 2004 budget, formulated a "menu of
pain" aimed at reducing the fiscal gap by $45 trillion.38 To achieve the
goal, they calculated that the government could raise federal income
taxes by 69%; increase payroll taxes by 95%; cut federal spending by
106%; or cut Social Security and Medicare by 45%.39 Taken separately,
or mixed and matched, none of these options is particularly appealing.
Each reveals the seriousness of the problem facing the United States.
Viewed in toto, the predictions of demographers and economists
foreshadow the potential resurrection of one of the more regrettable
incidents in our economic archive. Dare I invoke stagflation?
Demographers predict that low birthrates and high retirement rates will
cause the workforce to shrink.40  Economists predict that the shrinking
work force will slow the economy.41 Demographers predict that the
number of retirees will grow to outweigh the number of workers.42
Economists predict that the shortage of workers will force the
government to issue staggering debt.43 In order to pay the debt, it will
be forced to raise taxes and inflate currency.44 The combination of high
taxes, high interest rates, and a sluggish economy is the classic
formulation for stagflation. And while it proved impermanent in the
1970s, stagflation corresponded to the lowest overall fertility rate in our
nation's history: the baby bust.45 And but for the baby bust, the country
in the Face of an Enormous Fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1285, 1298 (2004).
36. Id. at 1302 (noting that the fiscal gap "appears to be growth-proof because various
expenditure programs, no less than taxes, are pegged to [gross domestic product] over the long run").
37. Id.
38. KOTLIKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2, at 65 (citing JAGADEESH GOKHALE & KENT SMETrERS,
FISCAL AND GENERATIONAL IMBALANCES: NEW BUDGET MEASURES FOR NEW BUDGET PRIORITIES
(2003), available at http://www.clevelandfed.org/Research/PolicyDis/no5dec03.pdf). See also
Jagadeesh Gokhale & Kent Smetters, Measuring Social Security's Financial Problems (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11060, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 11060.
39. KOTLIKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2, at 65.
40. Id. at 6.
41. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 4.
42. KOTLIKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2, at 1.
43. Id. at 190.
44. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 127-128.
45. See generally KOTLIKOFF & BURNS, supra note 2; LONGMAN, supra note 5; WATIENBERG,
supra note I.
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might not be faced with the prospect of stagflation's second coming.
That long-feared apparition brings the importance of population
stability to the fore. Although stabilization of the United States
workforce-retiree ratio could occur without government intervention
over several generations, those generations, according to some authors,
would face high tax rates, delayed retirement, and severe inflation,
which are not ideal conditions for demographic recovery.46 It would be
preferable to avoid such a population shock if possible. The United
States should, therefore, revisit the role of families in the maintenance of
a stable population. Toward that end, this Article examines the
treatment of families by the Internal Revenue Code and concludes that
while the Code provides familial status benefits in a number of areas, it
covers only half of the necessary distance.
3. A preview and proposal
In order to determine the role of taxation in maintenance of a stable
population, it is necessary to first consider possible causes of declining
birthrates. Part II of the Article explores this phenomenon. It observes
that, in developed nations, womens' increased education and work force
participation are strongly correlated to delayed birth of the first child and
to smaller overall family size. Both empirical data and common sense
suggest such a result. Education and employment require large
investments of time and money, resources that are critical to would-be
mothers. Part II concludes that, as a result of time pressure and financial
pressure, there necessarily exists a group of women who would like to
have a first or additional child but who feel that they are unable to do so
because they lack the necessary resources.
Part III of this Article asks whether the tax code could aid in the
maintenance of a stable population level by reducing or removing the
disincentives that prevent women in this group from having additional
children. To make such a determination, it is first necessary to examine
whether individuals are responsive to changes in the tax law. A mixed
body of literature indicates that, in general, people at the margins may
respond to tax changes even though others do not. Since some of the
women described in this Article are in a marginal position, tax law
amendments may reduce or remove disincentives that currently prevent
them from adding a child to the family. Such a change would
necessarily benefit families in both marginal and inframarginal
positions, but the inframarginal effect, i.e., the provision of economic
46. Id. at 42-71.
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support to families who are not considering an additional child, is seen
by many as a laudable goal even absent any effect on population
maintenance.
In order to recommend an amendment that would accomplish both the
desirable marginal and inframarginal effects described above, it is
necessary to establish the current state of the law. Part IV of this Article
discusses benefits to families that are currently provided by the Internal
Revenue Code. The Code considers familial status in its dispensation of
credits and deductions and in its establishment of the appropriate tax
rate. Despite the existence of these family-oriented provisions, the
Code's approach to family taxation is fractured rather than holistic. For
instance, the current provisions are not neutral with respect to the labor
market decisions of secondary earners. While joint filing puts pressure
on secondary earners to remain at home by taxing their wages at an
artificially high rate, child care benefits implicitly express a preference
for working mothers. Part V concludes that, unlike existing provisions,
the family taxable unit, when offered as an elective provision, is neutral
with regard to secondary earners' labor market decisions.
Accordingly, Part VI argues that the United States should permit
taxpayers who elect income splitting to use the entire family, rather than
the married couple, as the unit of taxation. Adopting the family taxable
unit would make positive reproductive decisions tax-favored, thereby
removing a portion of the financial disincentive faced by families who
want, but feel that they cannot afford, additional children. Families who
elect to use the provision would aggregate their income and divide it by
the total number of members in the household. The resulting product
would be used to calculate the family's taxable income. Under this
system, larger families would benefit from lower tax rates, resulting in a
net transfer of wealth from single persons and smaller families to larger
ones. Part VI concludes that this transfer is justified because, in the
aggregate, children produce positive externalities, the costs of which fall
primarily upon their parents.
Finally, Part VII looks to France for a demonstration of how the
family taxable unit might work in practice. France adopted the measure
in the early twentieth century and maintains its use as one of a package
of measures designed to address population concerns. The principle
seems to work in practice. This Article then concludes that, aside from
its potentially useful role as a population stabilizing measure, adoption
of the family taxable unit is justified because it brings conceptual
coherence to family taxation while increasing freedom of choice for
secondary earners and families.
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II. POTENTIAL CAUSES OF DECLINING BIRTHRATES
In order to assess the potential value of the family taxable unit to
families that would like to have additional children but feel constrained
by external pressures, we must first consider why birthrates have
declined. Scholars have posited a variety of causes. In developing
countries, the spread of legalized contraception and abortion has given
women a reproductive choice with dramatic effect. 47  Migration from
agrarian to urban settings has made children less economically
desirable.48 In addition, mass communication is changing ideas about
the modem family.49 For instance, one study in Brazil correlated a drop
in birth rate from one region of the country to the next with the
introduction of television.5 °
These factors are no longer a concern in the United States. Instead,
American women are influenced in their child birth decisions by their
education, their careers, and the economy, among other things. 51
According to the National Center for Health Statistics, a woman's
educational attainment is the single best predictor of how many children
she will have.52 This observation is hardly new. From 1888 to 1900,
Bryn. Mawr women had a fertility rate of only 0.37 children per
graduate.53 And although those days are passed, a recent study
concluded that while higher education has no effect on the number of
children that women want, their pursuit of education delays
childbearing.54 That delay, in combination with factors described below,
47. WATFENBERG, supra note 1, at 97-98.
48. Id. at 94.
49. Id. at 102.
50. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 32.
51. See generally LONGMAN, supra note 5; WATTENBERG, supra note 1; KOTLIKOFF & BURNS,
supra note 2.
52. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 17.
53. Id. at 159. According to Longman, this trend caused Theodore Roosevelt to lament the
decline in fertility of "'old New England stock."' Id. Longman writes:
He attributed the trend partly to the "highly welcome emancipation of woman" but went
on to explain that "this new freedom has been twisted into wrong where it has been taken
to mean a relief from all those duties and obligations which, though burdensome in the
extreme, women cannot expect to escape."
Id. Fortunately, a more enlightened view prevails today.
54. RUTH WESTON ET AL., AUSTRALIAN INST. OF FAMILY STUDIES, "IT'S NOT FOR LACK OF
WANTING KIDS": A REPORT ON THE FERTILITY DECISION MAKING PROJECT 61 (2004), available at
http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/resreportll/aifsreportll.pdf (finding that women's expected
family size varies significantly with employment status). See also Claudia Goldin, Career and Family:
College Women Look to the Past (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5188, 1995),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w5188.
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necessarily limits family size. 5
Like education, entry into the workforce may delay a woman's
decision to have children. 56 The percentage of women of childbearing
age in the workforce rose from 34% to 60% in the last half of the
twentieth century. 57 Women's average age at the birth of their first child
and the number of years between subsequent births rose steadily over
the same period as a consequence. 58 However, there has been very little
change in the percentage of women giving birth between 1960 and the
present day.59 In other words, like education, entry into the workforce
does not affect women's desire to have a family, but it does affect what
the size of that family will be. Survey data support this assertion. In a
recent Gallup pole of women between the ages of 18 to 29, 42% of the
participants (a substantial minority) said that families with three or more
children were ideal in size. 60  Nonetheless, the data described above
predict that very few of the women surveyed will have such large
families and, as a correlative, that almost all of them will be employed.
Why do women delay childbirth once they have steady jobs? Work
imposes two important strictures on women with families. The first is
wage pressure, and the second is time pressure. The two are inextricably
intertwined. For instance, if childcare for hire is expensive or limited in
availability, two-earner families and single mothers must arrange for
alternative care. Only one-tenth of women who work full time receive
employer assistance for child care, and only one in twenty works for a
firm that offers on-site or off-site care. 6' Regardless, studies indicate
that the responsibility for arranging care, as well as the bulk of other
domestic responsibility, falls to the mother in a two-earner household.62
55. See WESTON, supra note 54, at 76 (noting that although the correlation between education
and preferred family size is not statistically significant, more highly educated individuals are, in fact,
less likely to be parents).
56. Id. at 92.
57. WATrENBERG, supra note 1, at 96.
58. KLEIN, supra note 15, at 218.
59. Id.
60. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 85. For some women, the choice to have a smaller family may
not be a conscious one. One study reports that 58% of women overestimate the number of their
childbearing years by five to ten years of age. Id. at 83. Nearly 40% of the women surveyed believed
that their fertility would not decline until age forty, while recent studies show that it drops as much as
50% by age thirty. Id. As a result, women who delay childbirth as a result of economic or on-the-job
pressure will, of necessity, have fewer children whether they like it or not.
61. Christopher J. Ruhm, How Well Do Parents with Young Children Combine Work and Family
Life 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ, Research, Working Paper No. 10247, 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w 10247.
62. Id. at 3 (noting that mothers spend nineteen hours per week on housework compared to ten
hours spent by fathers); Patricia Wen, Gen X Dad Luxury Vacations, Fast-Track Careers, and Bigger
Houses Used to Be a Priority for Family Men, but No Longer. Today's Young Fathers Are Taking
2007]
66 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAWREVIEW [Vol.76
Altogether, the average mother spends 35.5 hours per week on domestic
tasks including childcare-almost the equivalent of a second full-time
job.63 If the mother of a young child gives in to time pressure by leaving
her job or reducing her hours, she is immediately faced with wage
pressure because her current and future earning potentials are affected.
Even if she does not leave her job, researchers estimate that she will
suffer a wage penalty. 64 In comparison to similarly situated workers
who are not mothers, she will earn five to nine percent less per child. At
least one author speculates that the reason may be exhaustion.65
A third factor affects women's decisions about childbirth: the cost.
6 6
In one recently commissioned study, participants reported that the factor
that most influenced their childbearing decisions was the ability to
afford a child.67 The economic burden on parents raising a middle-class
child through age eighteen now exceeds one million dollars in direct
expenses and foregone wages, and it is estimated that an average child
consumes fully 62% of the amount of resources consumed by an adult.68
This one million dollars figure does not account for the cost of college
education or for post-majority support, and childcare costs make up only
a fraction of the expense.69 It is no wonder that, despite national
prosperity, people remain concerned about their ability to support an
additional child. v
A family's individual capacity to afford children is not the only
monetary consideration that may influence childbirth decisions. The
strength of the broader economy also plays a role. 71 Short-term
economic booms and busts, along with increased housing prices, have
caused younger people to delay starting a family and to focus instead on
the accumulation of human capital through education and career
advancement.72 In addition, an increasing number of younger couples
Paternity Leaves, Rejecting Overtime, and Rushing Home After Work to Do All the Things Many of
Their Own Fathers Didn 't, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 683363 (citing
study conducted by Families and Work Institute in New York finding that fathers spend 2.7 hours per
workday caring for children while mothers spend 3.3 hours per day).
63. Id. This number represents 19 hours per week of domestic work in addition to 3.3 hours per
day of childcare activities.
64. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 74.
65. Id.
66. WESTON ET AL., supra note 54, at 126.
67. Id.
68. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 34, 38.
69. Nonetheless, they can be significant, ranging from 5/o-30% of a family's disposable income.
See Ruhm, supra note 61, at 7.
70. WESTON ET AL., supra note 54, at 151.
71. Id. at 101.
72. Id.
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choose to be dual-earner couples in order to avoid the prospect of dual
unemployment.73
These trends comport with historical demographic observations. The
United States' total fertility rate prior to the Great Depression was 3.3
children per woman.74 During the Depression, the total fertility fell to
2.1 children per woman. 75  This was the first baby bust. The total
fertility rate rose slightly during the pre-war period but never above
3.0.76 The post-war era brought change. It favored young adults and
allowed them rapid upward socioeconomic mobility.77 By 1957, at the
height of the baby boom, the national birth rate had soared to 3.6
children per woman. 78 The strong birthrate and strong economy lasted
for approximately a decade.7 9 Then, the 1970s brought another change
in the form of social tension and economic stagnation. The birthrate
plummeted to 1.7 by 1976 and remained low until the economy
improved.80 These data indicate that childbearing decisions are not
influenced by personal economy alone. The national economy also
plays a role. Accordingly, the United States should consider whether it
is able to influence maintenance of a stable level of population. Decline
in the birthrate, in conjunction with the marked increase in the elderly
population, might cause an economic downturn, which might further
depress the birthrate, which might further worsen the economy, and so
on.81  It would seem appropriate, then, to take preventative measures
aimed at staving off the next baby bust.
Abroad, incentives have ranged from the expected to the bizarre.
Several European countries have instituted a panoply of family-oriented
tax credits including child allowances and child care credits.82  For
instance, Germany's new Elterngeld program allows one new parent
73. Id.
74. KLEIN, supra note 15, at 156.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 175. For instance, families benefited from a strong economy in combination with tax
allowances for home ownership and the availability of affordable housing. Id. at 176.
78. Id. at 156.
79. Id.
80. WATTENBERG, supra note 1, at 63.
81. This, of course, assumes that technological advances over the next fifty years will not
mitigate any reduction in the labor force. Honda's Asimo robot has already met with seven heads of
European state, including German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder. See Honda Worldwide, The Worlds
Most Advanced Humanoid Robot Meets Members of the EU, Jan. 25, 2005,
http://world.honda.com/news/2005/c050125_c.html.
82. Anne Reinstadler et al., Comparative Study on the Effects of Family Policy in French-
Speaking Countries, I J. POPULATION & SOC. SECURITY 492, 520 (Supp. 2003), available at
http://www.ipss.go.jp/webj-ad/WebJoumal.files/population/2003_6/19.Reinstadler.pdf.
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who stops working to claim an allowance of up to $2,375 per month for
twelve months.83  Elsewhere, Australia offers a one time payment of
$3,000 per newborn. 84  The mayor of Caldzadilla, Spain, presents each
new mother with an Iberian piglet.85 Singapore, on the other hand, has
launched a line of government-sponsored fragrances to induce fertility:
musky for men and floral for women.86 Britian, ever sensible, furnishes
baby bonds that allow newborn children to start trust funds.
87
Obviously, there are a variety of ways to approach the problem, many
of them beyond the scope of the paper, such as increased subsidization
of childcare or the provision of cash payments to parents or to
children.88 I focus here solely on use of the family as the taxable unit. I
do not view my proposal as a stand-alone measure that would single-
handedly ward off population shocks; however, it could play a useful
role in a package of measures aimed at population stabilization.89
Adoption of the family as the taxable unit stands out among the
available tax alternatives because it would bring theoretical consistency
to the current structure, which provides a smattering of family-related
provisions but fails to take a holistic view of the family. In addition,
83. Stephen Graham, Germany Hopes Bonus Will Finance Baby Boom, STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 4,
2007, at A9.
84. Birth Rate Linked to Fear of Losing Job, CANBERRA TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, available at 2005
WLNR 1211831.
85. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 145.
86. WATTENBERG, supra note 1, at 123. The fragrances are named "Romancing Singapore Eau
de Parfum." Id.
87. Graham, supra note 83.
88. For instance, one recent study noted that employers' family leave provisions in the United
States are "suboptimal." See Ruhm, supra note 61, at 8. According to the study, paid parental leave of a
certain length would improve women's labor market outcomes and would benefit children. Id. This
might, in itself, foster greater fertility. The study also revealed that access to high-quality formal day
care improves school readiness in pre-kindergarten children. Id. Knowledge of the benefits of daycare
might affect fertility by removing mothers' doubts about working rather than staying at home. Other
useful measures might include those that would provide greater access to quality childcare or those that
would defray the cost of a child's consumption by providing targeted benefits.
89. Most family-friendly measures could be employed to this end. For instance, Anne Alstott
has recommended the creation of "caretaker resource accounts." ANNE ALSTOTr, No EXIT: WHAT
PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 75-78 (2004). The accounts
would provide funds for childcare, for the caretaker's education, or for the caretaker's retirement
savings. Id. at 78. By making additional resources available for these uses, caretaker accounts would
ameliorate the loss of resources and opportunities inherent in the continuous care obligation assumed by
caretakers. Id. at 90. In contrast, Donald Tobin has proposed the creation of a "Child Investment Fund"
that would make annual payments directly to children. Donald B. Tobin, Investing in Our Children: A
Not So Radical Proposal, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 459 (2004). The stipends would alleviate societal
underinvestment in children's human capital, and children would be required to repay them upon
maturity. Id. at 457-59. These proposals, and many others, recognize that in the aggregate, children are
a net good even though they place financial and other strictures on their caretakers. My proposal is
similar in this regard.
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adoption of the family taxable unit would allow families to individually
allocate their added resources in accordance with their own, rather than
the government's, preferences.
III. Is FAMILY PLANNING RESPONSIVE TO CHANGES IN TAX LAW?
Before discussing the merits of the method, it is necessary to answer a
gateway question: whether women adapt their family-related behaviors
in response to changes in the tax law. Empirical studies have repeatedly
suggested that a small, but measurable, portion of individuals respond to
tax law amendments. These studies fall into three separate, but not
insular, categories: the tax effects on labor supply, the marriage
decision, and the childbearing decision.
Studies regarding the effect of taxes on labor seem to be the clearest
and most abundant. For instance, it is "widely accepted" that the Earned
Income Tax Credit increased labor force participation by single
mothers.90  This is because work force participation among single
mothers remained at a near constant level from 1975 to 1992 but rose
very rapidly after expansion of the credit. 91 Results of another study
suggest that expansions in the credit have increased married men's
participation in the workforce but have decreased married women's
participation. 92  In addition, a 1995 economic analysis of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 revealed a correlation between increased labor
participation of high-income, married women and reduced marginal tax
rates.93 A third study attributed part of the 27% increase in annual hours
of work among women between 1981 and 1989 to the same act.94
Studies have also revealed a low, but measurable, response to the tax
law in marriage decisions. Although their results are not breathtaking,
these studies are important to consider nonetheless, given the still-close
90. NADA EISSA & AUSTIN NICHOLS, 2005 AEA/NEA JOINT SESSION ON "SKILLS, POLICY AND
LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES ACROSS DEMOGRAPHIC GROUPS," TAX-TRANSFER POLICY AND LABOR
MARKET OUTCOMES 1 (2005), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411237_tax-transfer.
pdf; Nada Eissa & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Labor Supply Response to the Earned Income Tax Credit, 111 Q.
J. ECON. 605, 607 (1996) (noting that the introduction of the EITC correlates to increased labor force
participation of single women with children relative to those without).
91. Ruhm,supra note 61, at 2.
92. See Nada Eissa & Hilary Williamson Hoynes, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Labor
Supply of Married Couples 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6856, 1998),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6856; Ruhm, supra note 61, at 10.
93. Nada Eissa, Taxation and Labor Supply of Married Women: The Tax Reform Act of 1986 as
a Natural Experiment 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5023, 1995), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5023 (attributing the increase to a 36% increase in the after-tax wage of a
woman in the top bracket who earned under $30,000 per year).
94. Id. at 6.
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relationship between marriage and childbearing. In 1995, James Alm
and Leslie Whittington found a negative correlation between increased
income tax rates and the aggregate marriage rate: when income taxes
rise, the marriage rate declines. 95  The effect is, however, "quite
small. 96 A similar correlation occurs with an increase in the marriage
penalty.97 These results were confirmed by Hector Chade and Gustavo
Ventura, who found that increased tax rates on married couples result in
a small, but measurable, reduction in the number of marriages.98 The
study also demonstrated that increased tax rates on married couples are
positively correlated with the number of couples who cohabit rather than
marry. 99 Finally, a recent examination of welfare reform showed similar
responsiveness. l00 The study observed changes in family structure, such
as household composition and marital status, as a result of the passage of
the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act. 10 1 It is
reasonable to conclude, based on the results of these studies, that
families at the margins are responsive to changes in the law that affect
their financial well-being.
This generalization cannot be extended to the childbearing decision
without further examination. Career orientation, marital status, and
financial well-being are only three of the myriad characteristics, beliefs,
and preferences that might affect one's choice to have a child. Many of
these characteristics are personal and unique to their owner, such as
religion or culture, marital status, or number of siblings. 10 2 Tax policy
cannot affect these circumstances; however, it can lessen obstacles faced
by those who want additional children but whose choice is limited by
time and wage pressures. As a result, the question of whether would-be
mothers will respond to family-friendly changes in the tax law is a
95. James Aim & Leslie A. Whittington, Income Taxes and the Marriage Decision, 27 APPLIED
ECON. 25, 26 (1995).
96. Id.
97. See James Aim, Stacy Dickert-Conlin & Leslie A. Whittington, Policy Watch: The Marriage
Penalty, 13 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 200 (1999).
98. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, Income Taxation and Marital Decisions, 8 REV. ECON.
DYNAMICS 566, 590-91 (2005).
99. Id. at 591.
100: See Marianne P. Bitier, et al., The Impact of Welfare Reform on Living Arrangements (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8784, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w8784.
101. Id.
102. See Raquel Fernandez & Alessandra Fogli, Culture: An Empirical Investigation of Beliefs,
Work, and Fertility (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11268, 2005), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/wl1268; Raquel Fernandez & Alessandra Fogli, Fertility: The Role of
Culture and Family Experience (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11569, 2005),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 11569.
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unique one. The field for change is very narrow, including only those
families who might want additional children but who must be financially
encouraged to have them. Because there is no practical, non-intrusive
means of identifying such families, the policy, in order to be effective,
must apply broadly to all families. As a result, any empirically
measurable response will seem slight in relation to the benefit-eligible
cohort, even if the policy has its intended effect.
Strong empirical data on the effect of tax policy on birth decisions is
not available for a representative sample of the United States
population. 10 3 This is because the United States does not yet have any
avowedly pro-natalist or anti-natalist tax laws. One study, conducted by
Leslie Whittington, James Alm, and H. Elizabeth Peters, focused on the
personal exemption for dependents. 10 4  The authors observed that the
personal exemption for dependents is implicitly pro-natalist because it
encourages fertility by decreasing the relative cost of each child.'0 5
Using an economic model with data on the birthrate, the amount of the
dependent exemption, margin tax rates, and wages, among other things,
the study generated results that "support the hypothesis that an increase
in the tax value of the personal exemption leads to an increase in
demand for children."' 0 6 The authors therefore concluded that tax policy
may have an impact on aggregate birth decisions. 1
07
The Whittington-Alm-Peters study supports the findings of
macroeconomic and microeconomic studies of European tax policies
indicating that strong family policies influence the birthrate. 108 For
instance, a study of family allowances in various countries from 1977
until 1981 showed a strong positive correlation (0.81) between family-
103. It has been suggested that one could look to studies assessing the effect of changes in welfare
benefits on fertility. In my opinion, the two situations are not comparable. Recipients of welfare rely
upon the payments they receive to pay for subsistence-level consumption. A middle-income family
would not face the same consideration. Furthermore, studies of the effect of welfare on fertility have
been inconclusive. See Theodore Joyce et al., Welfare Reform and Non-Marital Fertility in the 1990s:
Evidence from Birth Records 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9406, 2002),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9406 (noting that welfare reform has not reduced non-marital
fertility and that studies assessing the effect of welfare benefits on fertility have been inconclusive);
Melissa S. Keamey, Is There an Effect of Incremental Welfare Benefits on Fertility Behavior? A Look
at the Family Cap 3, 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9093, 2002), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9093 (noting that implementation of a family benefits cap failed to change
the birthrate of women on welfare and stating that welfare fertility studies in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s
produced mixed results).
104. Leslie A. Whittington, James Aim & H. Elizabeth Peters, Fertility and the Personal
Exemption: Implicit Pronatalist Policy in the United States, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 545 (1990).
105. Id. at 547.
106. Id. at 552.
107. Id.
108. Reinstadler et al., supra note 82, at 523.
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friendly policies and recorded births. 10 9 It also observed that pro-family
countries added more population during the post-war baby boom and
suffered a lesser decline in birthrate during the ensuing baby bust. 110
Another study found that while family-friendly policies in France did
not influence families' decisions to have a first child, they increased the
birth rate of second-born children among families with limited
income."' A third study, conducted in 1997, concluded that a 25%
increase in family benefits in France would raise the number of children
born per year by 4%, which would be the equivalent of a 0.07% increase
in its total fertility rate."
2
On the basis of these studies, and studies of how tax policies affect
labor and marriage decisions, it is reasonable to predict that a family-
friendly change in the tax law would have some small, but measurable,
effect on families' childbearing decisions. Using the studies of labor
participation as an example, it is also reasonable to predict that the effect
would be most observable at the margin. In other words, affected
families would be those that, for reasons of time or wage pressure,
believed they could not afford an additional child, but whose need for
additional resources was equal to or less than the benefit provided by the
tax amendment.
IV. FAMILY TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES
In order to identify what sort of amendment to the Internal Revenue
Code might be appropriate to support such families, it is necessary to
review existing family-oriented tax laws. The Internal Revenue Code
contains a number of such provisions, including various deductions and
credits, specified rates for couples and for heads of household, and the
aforementioned exemption for dependents. In each of these provisions,
one can see Congress's concern for families. Yet, when viewed as a
collective course of action intended to benefit families, the provisions
appear rather assorted and motley. This is because they are undergirded
by sometimes conflicting economic conceptualizations of the family. At
its core, the Internal Revenue Code continues to apply to individuals, not
families, and many family benefits are available only to those with
limited means. The following paragraphs detail some of the provisions
currently applicable to families under the Code: personal and dependant
exemptions, child and dependant care credits, medical care benefits, the
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 524.
112. Id.
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earned income tax credit, head of household status, and joint filing.
1. Personal and Dependent Exemptions
The Internal Revenue Code provides a variety of family-related
credits and deductions; however, most are either means-tested or phased
out at high levels of income." 3 For instance, the Code allows taxpayers
a personal exemption and an additional exemption for each qualified
dependent.14 A qualified dependent includes a taxpayer's children."
15
The exemption was $3,300 for 2006, but it is phased out for high income
taxpayers. 11
6
A taxpayer does not receive the dollar value of the dependent
exemption but instead receives the tax savings that it generates. For
example, if a taxpayer in 2006 had been subject to a tax rate of 15%, she
would have received tax savings of less than $500, which is equivalent
to the tax that she would have paid on the exempt amount of $3,300.
While that amount is better than nothing, it has not kept pace with the
growing economy. According to one author, "Since the late 1940s, the
tax burden on households with dependents has grown disproportionately
in comparison with households without dependents."' 17 The exemption
has also been criticized because it is not tailored to the actual cost of
raising children."'8  The dependent exemption's tendency to become
outmoded in times of economic growth would not be a problem if the
United States adopted the family taxable unit as proposed in Part V.
Indeed, the dependent exemption would become utterly unnecessary
because the rate structure, when combined with family income splitting,
would alleviate disproportionality of the tax burden on families who
choose to have additional children. The dependent exemption could be
eliminated entirely.
113. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 21, 24, 151(c) (West 2006).
114. 26 U.S.C. § 151(c).
115. Id. § 152.
116. Rev. Proc. 2005-70, 2005-2 C.B. 979. The phase-out amounts for 2006 range from $112,875
for married taxpayers filing separately to $225,750 for taxpayers who are married filingjointly. Id.
117. Ayla A. Lari, Sharing Alike: French Family Taxation as a Model for Reform, 37 DuQ. L.
REV. 207, 218 (1999). The author notes that "[t]o be the equivalent to the 1948 exemption, the 1984
exemption si ould have been $5,600; instead it was $1,000." Id.
118. See William M. Gentry & Alison P. Hagy, The Distributional Effects of the Tax Treatment of
Child Care Expenses (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5088, 1995), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w5088 (noting that the uniform dependent exemption is not tailored to the
cost of caring for a young child versus the cost of caring for an older one).
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2. Child and Dependent Care Credits
In addition to exemptions for dependents, the United States provides
child and dependent care credits. The child credit was $1,000 per child
in 2007, with a phase-out beginning at $110,000 for taxpayers filing a
joint return and $75,000 for unmarried taxpayers. 19 The dependent care
credit applies to individuals who maintain a household that includes a
qualified dependent, such as a child under the age of thirteen or a
handicapped individual. 120 The provision allows a 35% credit against
tax for the expense of dependent care, 12 1 but taxpayers may only claim
$3,000 of expenses for one dependent or $6,000 of expenses for multiple
dependents. 122 The credit is phased out beginning with income in excess
of $15,000 and is completely eliminated at income greater than
$85,000.123 The Code offers a similar credit for adoption expenses not
to exceed $10,000.124 Last, but not least, the Code provides that
taxpayers may exclude up to $5,000 of income as part of an employer-
provided dependent-care assistance program.' 25  An employee who
participates in such a program cannot claim the dependent care credit,
but the program must provide childcare that conforms to the mandates of
the Code section that governs the credit. 126 Although the child credit,
the dependent care credit and the dependent care assistance exclusion do
not actively impair women's childbirth decisions, they are of limited
usefulness to middle-income, two-earner couples due to the phase-out
levels. Less severe limitations, or better yet, a different system of taxing
families altogether, could more effectively foster a family's ability to
choose to have additional children while lessening the financial burden
attendant upon the secondary earner's choice to work.
3. Medical Care Benefits
The Code also recognizes the family as an economic unit in its health
care provisions. For instance, § 35 allows taxpayers to deduct the cost
of health insurance that they purchase for dependents. 127 Section 104
provides that the payout from such insurance resulting from a
119. 26 U.S.C.A. § 24 (West 2006).
120. Id. § 21(a).
121. Id. § 21(a).
122. Id. § 21(c).
123. Id. § 21(a)(2).
124. Id. § 23.
125. Id. § 129(a).
126. Id. § 129(e)(1), (e)(7).
127. Id. § 35(a).
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dependent's illness or injury is excluded from income. 128  Likewise,
§ 106 excludes from income amounts paid by employers to insure the
dependents of employees, and § 105 excludes the payout of those
policies from income. 129 Finally, § 213 allows a taxpayer to deduct the
uninsured cost of a dependent's medical and dental expenses from
income. 130  These provisions make clear that Congress regards the
family as a unit when health care expenses are involved.
4. Earned Income Tax Credit
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is arguably the most important
family-oriented credit in the Internal Revenue Code. The credit is
refundable and is available to low-income working individuals and
families.' 3 1 In 2003, more than 21 million taxpayers collected more than
$36 billion in EITC payments, lifting many of the credit's recipients
above the poverty line.132 Like most other family-friendly provisions in
the Internal Revenue Code, the EITC is means tested. It is worth
approximately forty cents for every dollar earned, and it is phased out as
income increases to specified levels.1 33  To qualify, the taxpayer's
earned income and adjusted gross income must be less than $30,338 if
the taxpayer has one qualifying child and less than $34,458 if the
taxpayer has more than one qualifying child.134 Although broad in scope
and extremely valuable at lower income levels, as with other credits in
the Internal Revenue Code, the EITC does little to help career women in
middle-income families who would like to have, but cannot afford,
additional children.
128. Id. § 104.
129. Id. §§ 105, 106.
130. Id. § 213.
131. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, It's Easier Than Ever To Find Out if You
Qualify for EITC, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=96406,00.html (last visited June 16,
2007). Congress originally approved the EITC in 1975 in part to offset the burden of social security
taxes and to provide an incentive to work, but its scope has since expanded. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Internal Revenue Serv., Dep't of the Treasury, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers:
Qualifying Child(ren) Residency Certification Test, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id
=l 19267,00.html (last visited June 16, 2007). A qualifying child is one who is the taxpayer's son,
daughter, adopted son or daughter, stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, stepbrother, stepsister, or a
descendent of any of them, and whom the taxpayer cares for as her own child. Id. A qualifying child
must be under the age of 19 or must be under the age of 24 and a fulltime student. Id.
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5. Head of Household Status
Another way in which the Code recognizes families is through
provision of a separate rate schedule and standard deduction for heads of
household. 135 A head of household is a person who is not married and
who has at least one child. 136 By dint of being a single parent, a head of
household benefits from wider income brackets at lower levels of
taxation than those that apply to single filers. 137 As a result, heads of
household bear less tax burden per dollar of income than single people
bear. 138 In addition, heads of household are entitled to a larger standard
deduction than single people.' 39  In 2006, the standard deduction for
heads of household was $7,550, which is significantly greater than the
$5,150 deduction given to single filers. 140  It is worth noting that the
difference only benefits taxpayers who do not itemize deductions on
their returns. Practically speaking, then, it benefits only taxpayers who
do not owe a significant amount of mortgage interest or deductible state
tax.
6. Joint Filing
Finally, no discussion of United States family taxation would be
complete without joint filing. The Internal Revenue Code contains four
rate tables: one for single filers, a second for joint filers, a third for
married persons filing separately, and a fourth for heads of household. 141
Married couples are strongly encouraged to file joint returns. Those
who do not may face less favorable treatment as married persons filing
separately. 142 In 2006, if a husband earned nothing and a wife had
taxable income of $50,000, the couple paid $9,171 if they filed
separately. 143 If the husband had $10,000 of taxable income, and the
wife had $40,000 of taxable income, they paid $7,810 if they filed
135. See 26 U.S.C.A. § I(b) (West 2006).
136. Id. § 2(b).
137. Id. § 1(b).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 63(b)(2).
140. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX
RETURN, FORM 1040 (2006).
141. See 26 U.S.C.A. § I (West 2006); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
PACKAGE 1040-1, 2006 1040 FORMS AND INSTRUCTIONS 65 (2006). To illustrate, the 2006 liability on
taxable income of $50,000 for single filers and married persons filing separately was $9,171. Id. For
heads of household it was $8,004, and for joint filers it was $6,774. Id.
142. See 26 U.S.C. § 1.
143. Id.
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separately. 144 If the husband had $20,000 of taxable income, and the
wife had $30,000 of taxable income, they paid $6,810 if they filed
separately. 145 In any of these earning scenarios, the couple would have
only paid $6,774 as joint filers, which is less than any of the separate
filing options. Like the credits and deductions described above, the joint
filing system provides a clear example of Congress's understanding of
the taxable unit as something more than just an individual. Finally,
although the joint filing system could be construed as a benefit to
families, it is frequently criticized for its penalization of secondary
earners, described below.
V. THE PURSUIT OF CONCEPTUAL COHERENCE AND FUNCTIONALITY
1. Fractured versus Holistic Treatment of Families
The provisions described above are concrete demonstrations of
Congress's perception of the family as an economic unit. 146  Each
provision recognizes a shared economic effect: families must shoulder
additional expenses, and those expenses are tempered by economies of
scale. Why, then, does Congress stop short of formally recognizing the
family as the unit of taxation? Its failure to do so is conceptually
inconsistent with other portions of the tax formula that recognize and
reward family status. Accordingly, adoption of the family as the taxable
unit would not be radical departure from the status quo. It would merely
carry the current concept of income splitting among family members to
its logical conclusion.
The family taxable unit is not without detractors. Despite its obvious
intuitive appeal, and its current quasi-embodiment in the Code, use of
the family as an economic unit has been criticized as antithetical to the
individualist principles inherent in feminist theory. Marjorie
Kornhauser has argued that regarding the family as an economic unit is
tantamount to disregarding women's needs and contributions.
Specifically, she asserts:
[F]eminist theory undercuts the very premise that the family is an
economic unit. The economic unit theory assumes that the family is a
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. In addition, Victor Thuronyi has suggested that the exclusion of gifts from gross income
under § 102 of the Internal Revenue Code can be viewed as an extension of the family taxable unit
concept. See Victor Thuronyi, The Concept of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 75 (1990). Professor
Thuronyi's observation illustrates the omnipresence of the family in tax statutes.
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monolithic, homogeneous group in which all members share the same
tastes and resources, including income, equally. Under this "benign
patriarch" theory of the family, the male "head of household"
traditionally speaks and acts for the unit. True pooling presumes equality,
if not in contribution to the pool, then at least in free access to the pool.
Although partners are moving toward more equal arrangements,
disparities still exist. 147
As it applies to my proposal, this observation lacks in two respects.
First, it conflates control over family consumption choices with the
economic burden that those choices impose on disposable income of the
family. Children's consumption must necessarily be drawn from
parents' resources, and it therefore affects both parents' ability to pay
taxes either separately or in the aggregate. 148 In other words, children's
consumption is a gender-neutral actor that impacts family members'
bottom lines even where income pooling is incomplete. Second, the
idea that the family taxable unit treats the family as "a monolithic [and]
homogeneous group" headed by a "benign patriarch" who "speaks and
acts for the unit," is, I suspect, increasingly obsolete. 149 To the extent
that Professor Kornhauser's objection is based on the government's
acknowledgement of the family as a cohesive group of people rather
than an assortment of cohabiting strangers, it fails to account for the fact
that, during childhood, children generally do not cover their own
expenses. 150
While viewing the family as a cohesive unit does, as Professor
Kornhauser suggests, treat individual family members as part of an
economic collective, it makes no assumptions about the distribution of
resources within that collective. Rather, it observes that some of the
resources acquired by members of the collective are used to purchase
common goods such as a place to live, furniture for comfort, and food to
eat. This observation does not require an espousal of "benign
patriarchy." In addition, to the extent that use of the family as the
taxable unit offends our perception of women as individuals (it does not
147. Marjorie E. Komhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 97 (1993).
148. Although Professor Komhauser argues that families do not pool resources, in which case
consumption of one family member should not affect another, the data are inconclusive. She states that
70% of all married couples in one survey deposited their earnings "solely in joint accounts." Id. at 86.
A second survey, involving law students in committed relationships, revealed that over 55% "kept all
wages jointly." Id. Note that these data, which indicate a high level of pooling on their own, do not
address instances of partial pooling, which I predict would raise the numbers well above the 70% and
55% figures observed in Professor Kornhauser's surveys. As a result, the argument that family pooling
is not supported by empirical data is not well founded, at least as regards basic expenses.
149. Id. at 97.
150. Dakota Fanning excepted, of course.
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offend mine in the least), that offense is counterbalanced by the greater
freedom of choice afforded to women under my proposal than under the
current system of family taxation. Because the benefit provided by the
family taxable unit is not dependent upon conformity to congressionally
determined income or childcare standards, it is significantly less
paternalistic than the smattering of credits, deductions, and assorted
rates that the Code now contains. Finally, it bears noting that under my
proposal, families would not be required to use the family taxable unit.
Rather, the provision would be elective and would therefore extend to
families, and the individuals within them, the opportunity to choose the
best available outcome.
In conclusion, Congress already views families as economic units,
and naturally so. Despite the objections noted above, the half-steps
already taken by Congress demonstrate its acknowledgment of some
level of economic interdependence among family members, and
particularly children. To textually describe the family as an
economically cohesive unit in only a select handful of Code sections
while effectively treating it as a unit in all instances through provision of
dependent exemptions in the calculation of taxable income is
conceptually inconsistent. By providing scattered benefits, Congress has
failed to provide holistic treatment of the family. Adoption of the family
as the taxable unit is a clear and simple remedy to that problem.
2. Neutrality and Freedom of Choice
No matter how equitable from an economic perspective, adoption of
the family taxable unit will be undesirable if it creates, rather than
relieves, pressure on women's work and family choices. Inherent in the
idea that some women would like to have additional children but feel
that they lack sufficient time or resources is the idea that circumstances
external to the family introduce inelasticity into the childbearing
decision. Although the Code seeks to remedy some of the financial
burden associated with childrearing, in most cases, the benefits provided
are contingent upon a family earning very little income, making choices
sanctioned by Congress, or both. These strictures constrain women's
choices. For this reason, simply removing income restrictions from the
Code's current benefits is not the best solution.
a. Freedom to Choose Work Either Inside or Outside of the Home
A significant element of the family benefits provided by the Code-
the tax treatment of childcare expenses-applies only to families in
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which both parents work. 15 1  By carving out a financial benefit on the
basis of childcare costs, Congress has recognized that childbearing and
childrearing may limit women's job opportunities. 5 2  Nonetheless,
allowances provided solely to working mothers evidence a labor-market
oriented approach to family taxation. 153 By acknowledging the
difficulties faced by working mothers without also acknowledging the
difficulties faced by stay-at-home mothers, Congress has, either
purposefully or inadvertently, expressed a preference for market
participation over at-home labor.' 54  In her article, Taxing Housework,
Nancy Staudt notes the lack of justification for this preference given that
women's individual preferences for housework versus market work
vary. 155  Anne Alstott, too, has posited that encouraging secondary
earners to enter the marketplace does not necessarily produce a laudable
result.156  This is because "the goal of encouraging market work
presupposes that women's nominal preference for family labor either is
suspect and ought to be changed, or is simply dysfunctional."' 157  Stated
151. See 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 21, 129 (West 2006).
152. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1605 (1996) (noting that §§ 21
and 129 demonstrate Congress's recognition that children interfere with the pursuit of economic
independence). See also ALSTOTT, supra note 89, at 21-27 (noting that childrearing is time-consuming
and unpredictable work that may result in lost wages, lower career achievement, and lost social security
benefits).
153. See Staudt, supra note 152. I say "inadvertently" because the joint filing system clearly
discourages labor-force participation by secondary earners in some instances.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1585-86. As an empirical matter, the level of child care credits that a family expects to
receive is positively correlated with a mother's return to work within three months of her first child's
birth. See Jacob Alex Klerman & Arleen Leibowitz, Child Care and Women's Return to Work after
Childbirth, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 284, 287 (1990).
156. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institutional Choices,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 2001, 2046 (1996). In fact, I would argue that it does not. The decision to be a
stay-at-home parent is an intensely personal choice with which the government should not interfere, and
it involves elements of both the parent's welfare as well as the child's. The effect of daycare on children
is, as of yet, unclear. Studies of its effects have produced contradictory reports. See Michael Baker et.
al, Universal Childcare, Maternal Labor Supply, and Family Well-Being, 10-11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 11832, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl 1832 (detailing
conflicting reports on the effect of childcare on wellbeing of the child). Baker and his team found that
daycare in Quebec increased parents' perception of their children's hyperactivity, aggression,
inattention, health, motor and social skills. Id. at 4. They note, however, that there are a variety of
explanations for the result, including the study's reliance on parents' subjective observations. Id. Other
studies indicate that the rise of the dual-income family has not been detrimental to children. For
instance, a corresponding increase in paternal participation has been shown to aid children's cognitive
development. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1048 (1993). In addition, children raised by stay-at-home
mothers are more likely to exhibit gender bias against women. Id. Another study has shown that
children benefit from growing up with a mother who is satisfied with her occupation rather than one
who feels stifled. Id. It is fair to say that there is no real consensus on the net effect of mixed care.
157. See Alstott, supra note 156, at 2047. Professor Alstott notes that tax policy proposals that
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more simply, not every secondary earner wants to work outside of the
home, and there is nothing aberrant about such a preference.' 58
Adoption of the family taxable unit as an elective provision would
neither encourage nor discourage labor market participation. Instead, it
would provide a labor-neutral benefit by financially cushioning
households that forego a second wage while allowing those with two
earners to afford necessary childcare or other consumption goods. 159  Its
use therefore allows families to make the labor participation and
spending decisions that are optimal in light of their unique
circumstances. In this regard, the family taxable unit is preferable to the
Code's current allowances.
b. Freedom to Choose How Best to Provide Care for One's Children
In addition to expressing a preference for dual-earner households, the
Code's childcare provisions also express a preference for certain kinds
of care. For families in which both parents choose to work outside of
the home, childcare is a vital issue and an intensely personal choice.
Some families prefer the care of relatives or close friends. Yet other
families prefer a facility in which their child will engage in educational
activities. Other families may prefer care provided by a religious
institution or a neighbor. Despite these myriad preferences, availability
of the childcare benefits provided by the Code is contingent upon the
parents' choice of care.
Under the current law, parents with sufficiently low income may
claim a means-tested credit for dependent care. 160  The credit is
affect women are often met with criticism because feminist scholars "differ significantly in their
objectives." Id. at 2002. She details three such conflicting objectives: equal treatment of men and
women, encouragement of market labor participation, and the provision of financial security to
caregivers. Id. Family allowances, like the family taxable unit, "represent a middle ground." Id. at
2053. See also Allan J. Samansky, Child Care Expenses and the Income Tax, 50 FLA. L. REV. 245, 251
(1998) (recommending the deduction of childcare expenses as business expenses as a "fair" solution that
will "prevent the income tax from inordinately distorting people's choices.").
158. In the past, the role of law and culture in encouraging women to choose a particular course-
that of staying at home-is at bottom of the problem that has generated the push to encourage women's
labor. Amy Wax has noted that societies have attempted to keep women out of the labor market
"through the application of custom, law or force to, in effect, close off choices entirely or alter the
background conditions against which choices are made." Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles,
Work and Taxing Women, 44 VILL. L. REv. 495, 495 (1999). This societal approach is objectionable
because it sequesters some women who would have preferred to participate in the labor market. It is
curious, then, that some feminist scholars would encourage lawmakers to once again "alter the
background conditions" in a way that could result in pressure on women who would prefer to remain at
home.
159. See Alstott, supra note 156, at 2045.
160. 26 U.S.C.A. § 21(a) (West 2006).
2007]
82 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA WREVIEW [Vol.76
calculated as a percentage of "employment-related expenses, 161 which
are those expenses that are "incurred to enable the taxpayer to be
gainfully employed." 162  They include things like babysitting and
daycare; 163 however, if a family chooses to place a child in a care center
outside of the home, the center must be state certified and must provide
care for more than six children.164 Children older than thirteen do not
qualify as dependents for purposes of the credit, so parents receive no
tax benefit to offset the cost of their care.
165
Although the dependent care credit can be generous for low-income
families, it is overly paternalistic. First and foremost, it assumes that
children over the age of thirteen do not require care even though mothers
of teenage children may be more likely to have fulltime jobs. Second, it
does not apply to families with a stay-at-home parent, even though that
parent may sometimes need a respite. Furthermore, it limits the choices
available to families who prefer childcare outside of the family home.
In other words, the credit is available only to those families who
acquiesce in or share Congress's childcare preferences.
The family taxable unit is different. Because it allows families the
choice of how to expend their additional resources, it is significantly less
paternalistic than the dependent care credit. Because relief under the
family taxable unit would be provided in the form of reduced
withholding, it would not be contingent upon particular labor force
decisions or particular childcare expenditures. Furthermore, both the
primary and secondary eamer would share in the benefit and could
separately decide how best to utilize it. This choice, whether made by
the family as a group, or by individuals within the family, should permit
the preferred allocation of resources. For instance, families could
choose out-of-the-home childcare provided by a trusted neighbor or a
church group without losing the tax benefit. Finally, the secondary
earner could choose to leave the workforce without jeopardizing the
benefit. None of these options are available under the current system.
VI. ADOPTING THE FAMILY TAXABLE UNIT
The family taxable unit is not a new idea, but it is one whose time has
come. It is equitable, it addresses freedom of choice, and it is easily
understood. As one scholar noted, "It is time to rethink our first
161. Id.
162. Id. § 21 (b)(2)(A).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 21 (b)(2)(B), (C).
165. Id. § 21(b)(1)(A).
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premises of taxation and the family. The family is a complex and
central social institution, and we can no longer treat it in a two-
dimensional manner."' 66  Likewise, witnesses before the President's
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform in March of 2005 have called for
fairer treatment of families. 167  Eugene Steuerle, in particular, has
suggested combining the child, earned income, and dependent care
credits; dependent exemptions; and filing status into a simpler, more
transparent system. 1
68
The dependent care credit alone, with its myriad exceptions,
qualifications, and definitions, covers three entire pages of the Internal
Revenue Code despite its miniscule font.' 69  Even explanatory
documents targeted at taxpayers are insufferable. The instruction
booklet for the 2006 Form 1040 was 143 pages long. 170  Because the
family taxable unit would entail the creation of a new rate structure, it
would obviate the need for most credits and deductions currently
provided by the Code. As a result, calculation of one's liability would
be simple, and the effect of an added child would be predictable.
Taxpayers considering an addition to the family could easily determine
the change in their tax liability. By contrast, under the current system,
only the most inquisitive and patient taxpayers can accurately predict the
resulting change.
The Internal Revenue Code's complexity makes it not only opaque,
but also malleable. Because it contains so many provisions, the Code is
a convenient and flexible legislative tool. It is amended with astonishing
frequency and often for the purpose of currying political favor.
171
Because of its changeable nature, individuals and families are unlikely
to rely on the deductions and credits provided in the Code when
budgeting for the addition of a child. Because adoption of the family
166. McCaffery, supra note 156, at 1060.
167. Susanne Pagano, Tax Experts Urge Panel to Address Fairness, Families in Reform Proposal,
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 56, at G-8 (Mar. 24, 2005).
168. Id.
169. See Internal Revenue Code (CCH) 102-05 (Jan. 2006).
170. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, 2006 1040 INSTRUCTIONS (2006),
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i 1040gi.pdf.
171. See. e.g., Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 780 ; Gulf
Opportunity Zone Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577; Energy Tax Incentives Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, §§ 1333, 1335, 1341, 119 Stat. 594, 1026-49; American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, 118 Stat. 1418; Working Families Tax Relief Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
311, 118 Stat. 1166; Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117
Stat. 752; Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21;
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38;
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788; Small Business Job Protection Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 110 Stat. 1755.
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taxable unit would reduce the number of provisions applicable to
individual taxpayers, it would also reduce the opportunity for knee-jerk
changes to the substance of the Code.
There are other sound reasons to choose the family taxable unit. First,
it would aid families who hope to grow, which may have the salutary
effect of contributing to the maintenance of population stability.
Second, when determining ability to pay tax, it is reasonable to account
for the number of family members for whom subsistence-level
consumption goods must be provided. Although studies suggest that
some degree of separate finances are prevalent among young, dual-
earner couples, even critics of the pooling justification for income
aggregation admit that birth of a child can spur the pooling of
resources. 172  Even where it can be demonstrated that a mother and
father make separate use of their disposable incomes, they must share
subsistence-level consumption, at the very least, with their children.
Third and finally, as described above, adoption of the family taxable unit
would bring conceptual coherence to the taxation of families while
facilitating individual mothers' preferred reproductive and labor
decisions.
1. The Mclntyre-Oldman and Bittker Proposals
Both Professor Bittker and Professors McIntyre and Oldman have
developed normative models for family taxation that are based on use of
the family taxable unit (the Bittker model and the MacIntyre-Oldman
model, respectively). 173  In the Bittker model, parents would deduct
childrearing expenses from income, and children would include those
expenses on their own income tax returns. 174 Because such expenses
could not be accurately accounted and because enforcement under this
system would be both intrusive and administratively burdensome,
Professor Bittker recommended allocating a fixed portion of the parents'
income to each child.
175
Likewise, under the McIntyre-Oldman model, income would be
attributed not to the family members who earn it but instead to the
family members who benefited from it. 176 MacIntyre and Oldman argue
172. Komhauser, supra note 147, at 88.
173. See generally Michael J. McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a
Comprehensive and Simplified Income Tax, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1573 (1977).
174. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1449
(1975).
175. Id. Allan Samansky has noted this problem as well. See Allan J. Samansky, Tax Policy and
the Obligation to Support Children, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 351 (1996).
176. McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 173, at 1575.
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that this form of benefit taxation comports with the Haig-Simons
definition of income, which includes consumption in the tax base.
177
McIntyre and Oldman argue that each family member's income under
the Haig-Simons definition must include his or her benefit from or
consumption of family goods, regardless of whether that consumption is
attributable to another family member on the basis of property law.
178
As a result, the McIntyre-Oldman model requires that family income,
which may or may not include the income of minor children, be
attributed to family members under a consumption-based formula.
179
For couples without children, income would be aggregated ard split
evenly between the two individuals.' 80 Finally, all taxpayers would
consult a single rate table, which would institutionalize the secondary-
earner penalty. 181
Maclntyre and Oldman argue that because a child consumes less than
an adult, and because their model was designed to reflect families'
financial realities as accurately as possible, per capita income sharing
under the model would be excessive, particularly at upper levels of
income. 82  Also, they argue that economies of scale mandate that a
decreasing share of income should be attributed to children as family
size increases. 83 Presumably, the decreasing share would be based on
empirical studies or on economic models. Note that, in contrast, France,
which also employs the family taxable unit, assigns a quotient familial
value of 0.5 to a family's first two children and a value of 1.0 to
subsequent children, reflecting support for the birth of third and
177. Id. at 1575-76. McIntyre and Oldman view the benefits received and shared by family
members as a kind of consumption. Id. at 1577. For example, although a parent who buys groceries is a
"consumer in the market sense," family members are the actual consumers of the food that the parent
brings home. Id.
178. Id. The professors do not address the question of whether a parent who earns income
consumes it by spending it on goods and services provided to the family. They assert that the question is
irrelevant because the child is the taxpayer with whom they are concerned. See id. at 1603. This feint
blurs the issue of whether they intend the Haig-Simons definition to apply to the family as a whole or to
the individual members. If applied to individuals, it follows that the earner parent should be viewed as
engaging in consumption when he or she provides resources to the family. This would result in double-
counting under the proposal.
179. id. at 1595.
180. Id. at 1596. A relevant question might be whether a child's consumption level changes over
time and, if so, whether the tax system should take that change into account. Consumption might also
be affected by the number of children. For instance, second and third children blessed (or cursed) with
hand-me-downs might consume less. Id. Finally, there might be an income level so blatantly in excess
of children's consumption that it should not be split among them. Id.
181. Id. at 1594.
182. Id. at 1605.
183. Id. at 1605.
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subsequent children.' 
84
The Bittker model and the McIntyre-Oldman model were not
forwarded with an eye toward assisting in maintenance of a stable
population level. In fact, Professor Bittker, who was writing from
beneath the rubble of Paul Ehrlich's Population Bomb, stated that the
income splitting benefit might be disallowed "for a year or two after the
birth of an 'excess' child." 185 Clearly, these models were unconcerned
with whether families wanted, but could not afford, additional children.
Rather, they were intended to comprehend the real-life financial
situation of families more accurately than the Internal Revenue Code.
18 6
For the purpose of providing encouragement to would-be moms and
dads, adoption of a more flexible and financially generous family
taxable unit is now preferable.
2. Assigning Values Within the Family Denominator
The model advanced here does not fractionalize the value assigned to
children for purposes of income splitting, but rather, it assigns a value of
one to each child. There are three reasons for this approach. First,
assigning a strict consumption-based value fails to account for the non-
monetary costs that children impose on a family. Second, a simple
integer value will provide a greater benefit to recipients while making
the provision easier for taxpayers to understand and respond
accordingly. Third, the family taxable unit requires us to view the
family, rather than its individual members, as the primary consumption
unit. Requiring assignment of income based solely on predicted
consumption of individual members obscures that view. Rather,
children's average consumption should be used only as a basis of
comparison.
Hypothetically, if a child consumes only half as much as an adult, an
economically accurate system would divide the taxable income of a
single parent with one child by 1.5. Compare this approach with the one
taken by France, where families are credited with half of a share for their
first two dependents and with a whole share for each additional
dependent.187 France's quotient reflects a value for the third child that is
twice as high as the value given to the first two, demonstrating the
country's preference for families with three children or more.
184. HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL
ANALYSIS 263 (2d ed. 2004).
185. Bittker, supra note 174, at 1449.
186. McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 173, at 1575.
187. Lai, supra note 117, at 239.
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The United States, which is politically and fiscally unable to adopt the
full panoply of France's family policies, should prize the first and the
second child as highly as the third if it hopes to alleviate the financial
disincentive to childbirth among women who refrain from having
children on account of time and wage pressure. Using children's
average consumption as a baseline, and rounding up to the nearest
integer for additional family benefit and administrative simplicity, I
propose that each dependent within a household be counted as a whole
unit or the integer multiple of a whole unit throughout minority for
purposes of splitting income among family members. Although this
amount exceeds the 0.5 value allotted by France or the 0.6 value
suggested by empirical evidence on children's consumption, a greater
allotment is desirable in the absence of additional family-friendly
policies such as widespread employer-provided childcare or allowances
for non-working parents. In other words, while assigning children an
income splitting value of one or two, for instance, may be excessive in
terms of how their actual consumption spurs pooling, the larger value is
justified if the goal of the provision is to assist families rather than to
precisely reflect their economic position.
Allocating an integer value to each dependent has an additional
advantage. It is administratively simple and, as a result, provides a level
of transparency that fractional allocation would not. Transparency
seems critical in a law designed to influence behavior. To the extent that
income allocation exceeds a dependent's actual percentage of
consumption, the additional amount might compensate for post-
majority, post-secondary educational support provided by parents who
can afford it, and it would give additional financial assistance to those
who cannot. That is crucial in an age when many men and women, at
the time when they are most likely to make reproductive decisions, are
saddled with long-term debt incurred for their own college educations., 
88
3. Determining Tax Liability
Once an income splitting value is assigned to children, it makes sense
to follow the groundwork laid by France. To determine tax liability,
aggregate household income would be divided by the number of earners
and dependents in the household. The resulting figure would be used to
identify a per-person dollar amount, which would be multiplied by the
number of persons in the household to arrive at the household tax. For
188. Adam Hime, Getting Schooled by the Hybrid-Based Tax: Equity and Efficiency in the
Federal Tax Treatment of Debt-Financed Post-Secondary Educational Expenditures, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
871, 873 (2004).
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example, a two-earner household with three children and total income of
$100,000 would consult the rate table to determine the per-person tax
amount allocable to $20,000 and would multiply that amount by five
persons to determine tax liability.
This system raises interesting, but not insoluble, questions regarding
withholding and joint and several liability among family members. To
the extent that scholars can derive withholding wisdom from the current
joint filing system, policy makers can choose to continue or to alter
current practices. Joint and several liability, however, presents a novel
issue in this context. Visiting the tax sins of the father upon the son
seems politically unpalatable, especially with regard to low- and middle-
income families. Regardless, it is conceivable that, in the absence of
whole-family joint and several liability, a small subset of individuals
who (a) are engaged in high-risk or fraudulent tax activity, (b) are
devious, and (c) are parents will view trusts established for the support
and maintenance of children as the equivalent of credit-shelter trusts.
Because I view the possibility of such transactions as remote, and
because nominee and transferee liability theories could prevent them if
broadly interpreted, I will not discuss them here.
4. Eliminating Secondary Earner Bias
The income aggregation and splitting mechanism just proposed raises
the specter of secondary earner bias to which I previous alluded.
Secondary earner bias is a characteristic that the family taxable unit
unfortunately shares with joint filing, and it therefore bears discussion.
While the joint filing system typically advantages the couple as a whole,
it often results in a higher rate of taxation on the secondary earner's
wages. The secondary earner is, more often than not, a woman.
189
Accordingly, a number of scholars have called for abolishment of joint
filing. 190 For this reason, use of the family as the taxable unit should be
elective rather than mandatory. The paragraphs that follow examine
gender issues associated with income aggregation and splitting and
conclude that although use of the family taxable unit also raises those
issues, the detriment is offset by provision of greater freedom to would-
be mothers than is afforded by family assistance measures contained in
the current Code.
189. In my opinion, this is changing. Future parity, I predict, will remove the secondary earner
penalty from the category of gender concerns into that of questions of overall fairness.
190. Among others, see Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and
Addressing the Gendered Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J. L. & POL. 241, 365 (1997); Kornhauser, supra
note 147, at 108.
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In his article, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, Professor
Bittker famously explained that it is impossible to simultaneously have a
progressive rate structure, equal taxation of married couples with equal
income, and a marriage-neutral tax burden. 19' Professor Bittker's article
concluded that "advocacy of a marriage-neutral tax system collides
directly and irretrievably with a dominant theme of tax theory for at least
50 years-the irrelevance of ownership within intimate family
groups.' 92  He noted that those who challenged the principle of
communal ownership within family groups, "together with its
implication that taxpaying capacity is best measured by consolidated
marital or family income" might "belatedly come to be honored as
unsung heroes if today's advocates of a marriage-neutral tax system
carry the day."
'193
That prediction has, to some extent, come to pass. As noted above,
feminist scholars have urged abolition of the joint return. 194 The reasons
are readily observable. Income aggregation and splitting provide
obvious benefits for couples where one spouse stays at home, but they
provide no benefit to equal-earner couples. 195 As a result, joint returns
are "thought to reinforce traditional gender roles in which the husband
works and the wife does not." 196 In other words, in marriages where the
wife earns less than the husband, income shifting from the husband to
the wife through the joint return is undesirable because it forces the wife
into a higher tax bracket than she would otherwise Occupy. 197 Evidence
suggests that this result discourages some women from working.' 98 In
addition, it imposes joint and several liability on the wife for tax debt
that is not attributable to her earnings.' 99 Finally, some scholars argue
that in spite of the added tax burden born by the wife, the husband
continues to control the bulk of his earnings.
200
These arguments against joint filing, while accurate in some
instances, run counter to its original inspiration. The joint return can be
191. Bittker, supra note 174, at 1396.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Christian, supra note 190, at 365; Komhauser, supra note 147, at 108.
195. Christian, supra note 190, at 248.
196. Id. In my opinion, arguments like this one, which assume that women are generally
secondary eamers, are increasingly dated and serve to reinforce traditional gender roles even more than
a tax system the language of which is gender neutral. For the time being, however, I will assume, in the
absence of strong empirical evidence to the contrary, that this hard-thought and, for some, genuinely-
held feminist position remains temporarily viable.
197. Id. at 255-56.
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traced to two Supreme Court cases. In Lucas v. Earl, the Court held that
couples could not contractually split their income, but that income must
be taxed to the person who earned it.20 1 In contrast, Poe v. Seaborn
sanctioned income splitting in community property states based on
common ownership established by state law.20 2 Responding to the
inequitable treatment of similarly situated taxpayers established by these
cases, states rushed to establish community property regimes, and
Congress instituted the joint return.2 °3 Joint filing, then, is predicated
upon common ownership or use of income earned by partners in
marriage. As a result, feminist arguments against joint filing have, at
their heart, the idea that one partner in marriage does not contribute to
the earning of and does not have a stake in the income of the other. This
view, which focuses on individual ownership and use of property,
discounts the importance of family consumption and support
obligations, which the family taxable unit takes into account.
In other words, income pooling is not dead. The McIntyre-Oldman
model, the Bittker model, and the currently proposed model of the
family taxable unit, all discussed previously in this Article, are at least
partially predicated on income pooling. Over the past decade, scholars
have observed that changing demographics, including the meteoric rise
of nontraditional families, have called old assumptions about pooling
into question.20 4 Fewer than ten percent of all people in the United
States still live in a nuclear family with a working father and a stay-at-
home mother.20 5 It is more common today for individuals who are also
members of families to secure some measure of financial independence206
by holding a portion of their assets separately. This is true for both
traditional and nontraditional families.20 7 Based on these assertions, one
study has concluded that Professor Bittker's reliance on marital pooling• '" ,,208 ^
of resources is now "largely unsupported by empirical evidence. " As
a result, the study argued that "[t]he joint return ought to be abolished.
A system that treats each person as a separate taxable unit is more
equitable, more consistent with basic tax principles, more efficient, and
ultimately better able to accomplish social family goals.
209
201. 281 U.S. 11I (1930).
202. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
203. Kornhauser, supra note 147, at 65.
204. Id. at 66-67.
205. McCaffery, supra note 156, at 985-86.
206. Kornhauser, supra note 147, at 78.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 80.
209. Id. at 108.
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While it is accurate to say that joint returns subject secondary earners
to higher marginal rates, it is not necessarily true that a tax system based
on the individual as the taxable unit is "more efficient" or "ultimately
better able to accomplish social family goals." '210 The joint return is
inefficient when it discourages secondary earners from entering the
workforce; however, it does not follow that treating the individual as the
taxable unit would be better. In order to make such an assertion, it is
first necessary to determine the choice or set of choices for which the
effectiveness of the measure is to be assessed. If we assume that
workforce participation and childbearing are desirable, use of the family
taxable unit may be more desirable because it is able to relieve wage
pressure through reduced withholding that is keyed to family size.
Additional resources will, in turn, enable two-earner families to relieve
time pressure by accessing paid child care and domestic assistance. In
single-earner families, the family taxable unit will, in part, compensate
for lost wages. Nonetheless, secondary earner bias caused by the joint
return is well documented and must be recognized by any proposal that
calls for income aggregation, including the family taxable unit.
A proposal to amend the tax system in favor of families must
eliminate secondary earner bias. To do so, use of the family taxable unit
must be elective within a dual rate table system. Consider two couples
with identical aggregate income of $100,000 per year. Assume that
there is a single rate table and that each person files individually until
the birth of a child. Couple A consists of Husband, who earns $50,000
per year, and Wife, who earns also $50,000 per year. Notice that neither
Husband nor Wife is a secondary earner because their incomes are
equal. When this couple has their first child, aggregation and income
splitting under the family taxable unit will notionally result in three
equal shares of $33,333.33. This is a good result for both Husband and
Wife because both of their incomes will be taxed at a lower rate.
In contrast, Couple B consists of Husband, who earns $30,000 per
year, and Wife, who earns $70,000 per year. Notice that Husband is a
secondary earner because his income is substantially less than Wife's
income. Like Couple A, when this couple has their first child,
mandatory aggregation and income splitting will notionally result in
three equal shares of $33,333.33. While this result is good for Wife as
the primary earner, it is not good for Husband, who, as the secondary
earner, may now be taxed at a higher rate on his income. The same bias
results from joint filing under the current system. Consequently, use of
the family taxable unit will only benefit Couple B if Wife's tax savings
210. Id. at 108.
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are greater than Husband's tax loss and the couple agrees on a suitable
allocation of the savings. Because the amount of savings and loss will
vary with income and with the family rate structure, it is possible that
mandatory imposition of family aggregation and income splitting will
leave Couple B in a worse position. This result would put pressure on
Couple B's labor and childbearing decisions and could lead to choices
against preference for both. For this reason, participation in the family
rate structure should be elective and separate, fairly calculated rate
tables should be established for families and for single filers. Although
this structure may result in net revenue loss for the federal government,
it maximizes freedom of choice and provides financial assistance while
maintaining taxpayers' civic responsibility to bear a portion of the
government's cost.
5. Addressing Progressivity Concerns
In addition to implicating secondary earner bias, use of the family
taxable unit raises concerns about the preservation of progressivity.
This is because it applies indiscriminately to all families, not just those
with low income. After all, families both rich and poor sacrifice time,
opportunities, and resources for their children. And as Professor Alstott
has noted, "Economic class is not a reliable metric for the autonomy
burden of child rearing, especially for mothers. 21' Inasmuch as
children represent a cost in any form to their parents, shouldn't a
government interested in maintenance of a stable population extend its
chosen benefit to all parents in the hope that the benefit will help those
on the margin who want to have children, even if those parents have
substantial income?
This, at first blush, excites little sympathy as a redistributive matter.
After all, why should taxpayers at large subsidize childbearing and
childrearing in families above the poverty line? The answer is that
children, in the aggregate, provide obvious externalities in the face
certain population aging and potential population decline. 212 Most of the
cost of those externalities is borne by parents who must pay for lodging,
211. ALSTOIr, supra note 89, at 96.
212. 1 am not alone in this assertion. Donald Tobin has noted that "[a]t all income levels,
investment in children-in education, housing, training, and nutrition-has significant beneficial returns
for both the recipients of the investment and society as a whole." Tobin, supra note 89, 458. Professor
Tobin therefore recommends the creation of "Child Investment Funds" that would provide children
under the age of fifteen with a yearly stipend of approximately $2,000. Id. at 459. See also Rolf
George, Who Should Bear the Cost of Children?, I PUB. AFF. Q. 1, 31 (1987) ("Children grow up and
become, among other things, providers of pensions, maintainers of society.... Now since they are free
agents, escaping thus the control of their investors, they become res ominia, benefit everyone.").
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food, clothing, education, medical care, and other expenses. When
viewed in the abstract, then, unsubsidized childbearing and childrearing
represent a redistribution of wealth (in the form of societal returns on
human capital, if you will) from larger families to smaller families and
single people. As an equitable matter, it makes sense to offset this
redistribution in some regard because families and single persons with
equivalent income are not similarly situated and therefore have different
abilities to pay. This consideration is conceptually separate from the
consideration of vertical equity, which is discussed below.
One manner of assessing the equitability of a tax policy is to examine
it in two directions: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal equity demands
similar taxation of similarly situated taxpayers, and vertical equity
demands progressivity. 21 3 In other words, vertical equity asks whether
taxpayers with more resources bear proportionally more of the tax
burden than those with fewer resources.214 At first blush, the family
taxable unit appears to contravene both principles. From a purely
income-oriented standpoint, horizontal equity requires that two families
of equal income be taxed equally. This result is impossible under the
family taxable unit unless all families of equal income have an equal
number of members, because tax liability varies with the number of
people in any given family. However, the family taxable unit can, to an
extent, achieve horizontal equity if tax is evaluated with an eye toward
family size.
There is no reason to adopt a purely income-oriented view of
horizontal equity. If one accepts the premise that, in some sense, tax
laws should be predicated upon ability to pay, family size must be taken
into account when evaluating equity. It then becomes apparent that a
two-earner, one-dependent family earning $100,000 and a two-earner,
four-dependent family earning $100,000 are not similarly situated.
Consequently, horizontal equity must be evaluated not only on the basis
of income but also with regard to the earner/dependent ratio. Using
these criteria, and focusing on dollars and cents, the family taxable unit
achieves horizontal equity because it taxes families with equal income
and equal numbers of dependents equally.
A similar analysis may be undertaken for vertical equity, but it will
produce different results. The family taxable unit is not progressive in
all circumstances, even among families with the same number of
children in a progressive rate structure. Consider the following worst
case example. Couple A has total aggregate income of $200,000 and
213. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99 TH CONG., ANALYSIS OF PROPOSALS RELATING TO
COMPREHENSIVE TAX REFORM 3-7 (Comm. Print 1985).
214. Id.
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Couple B has total aggregate income of $40,000. Assume that the
applicable rate schedule taxes an income per family member of less than
$20,000 at a rate of 10%. At $20,000 of income, the rate increases to
12.5%, and it increases by 2.5% for each additional $10,000 of income.
The rate brackets (with some omissions for brevity) are as follows:
Income/Individual Tax Rate
$0-$19,999 10%
$20,000 - $29,999 12.5%
$30,000 - $39,999 15%
$40,000 - $49,999 17.5%
$50,000 - $59,999 20%
$100,000 - $109,999 32.5%
Using the rate structure shown above, the following table compares
the hypothetical taxes on Couple A and Couple B as their families grow,
assuming that all income is taxed at the highest marginal rate. The table
demonstrates that progressivity of the family taxable unit breaks down at
low levels of income.
Number of Value Name Couple A: Couple B:
Dependents $200,000 $40,000
0 Income/Family $100,000 $20,000
Member
Tax Rate 32.5% 12.5%
Tax Liability $65,000 $5,000
2 Income/Family $50,000 $10,000
Member
Tax Rate 20% 10%
Tax Liability $40,000 $4,000
4 Income/Family $33,333 $6,667
Member
Tax Rate 15% 10%
Tax Liability $30,000 $4,000
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Although Couple A will always pay more tax than Couple B, the tax
itself becomes less progressive as the couples have additional children.
Notice that when the couples have no children, the ratio of Couple A's
liability to Couple B's liability is 13:1. When the couples have two
children, the ratio decreases to 10:1. When they have four children, it
reaches 7V: 1. Furthermore, although Couple A's savings per additional
child decreases more rapidly as a percentage of total income, Couple B's
total savings is maximized when they have one child. This is because
Couple B reaches the lowest tax bracket more quickly.
The benefit provided by the family taxable unit depends wholly upon
an additional dependent lowering the family's overall rate. For families
that are already taxed at or close to the lowest rate, this structure
provides no benefit at all. Based on the actual rate table for joint filers, I
estimate that these families comprised roughly 20% of the total number
of families who filed tax returns in 2003; however, I estimate that
families in the lowest two brackets comprised over 50% of all such
families.2 15 Therefore, if the current United States rate structure and
income dispersion were maintained, the family taxable unit would be
ineffective for almost half of all families.
Regardless, lack of progressivity under the hypothetical rate structure
above does not mean that the family taxable unit cannot be part of a
progressive system. Progressivity for all but the very lowest-income
taxpayers is a function of the rate structure and refundable credits or
grants within the system. Instead of retaining the currently wide lower
brackets, narrower brackets could be adopted at more frequent intervals
for low levels of income. Likewise, wider brackets could be adopted at
higher levels to restrict the benefit available to families at high levels of
income. In other words, Congress could make it easier for middle
income families to reach the next lowest bracket by adding dependents
but could make it more difficult for very high income families to do so.
Through bracket adjustment, Congress could manage redistribution via
the family taxable unit on the basis of two variables: income and
fertility. Furthermore, adopting this rate format would not impinge on
the population maintenance aspect of the family taxable unit.
Presumably, the very rich do not refrain from having a second or third
215. My calculation is based on data available from INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, STATISTICS OF INCOME, INDIVIDUAL COMPLETE REPORT 2003, PUBLICATION 1304, at Table
3.4 (2005), available at http://www.irs.treas.gov/pub/irs-soi/03in34tr.xls. Joint filers and heads of
household submitted 57,252,816 returns during the year. Id. 12,024,810 of them reported income in the
lowest bracket, and 23,187,937 of them reported income in the second lowest bracket. Id. These data
do not distinguish between filers who have children and those who do not, so my calculation is truly a
rough estimate.
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child on the basis of economic considerations.
6. Addressing Distributional Concerns
Perhaps the most politically potent criticism of the family taxable unit
is that it affords little or no assistance to low-income families. It could
therefore be viewed cynically as a bid to encourage upper- and middle-
income families to overtake low-income families by having many more
children per family. Such a policy would, of course, be morally
repugnant. Even if it were not, empirical evidence gives us no reason to
believe that encouraging growth solely among families with means
would produce any beneficial societal result. Furthermore, the fact that
the family taxable unit would provide a benefit to one audience-
middle- and upper-income families for whom finances may represent a
childbearing disincentive--does not preclude the government from
providing some other benefit to low-income families. As a result, the
idea that the family taxable unit would result in a middle-class baby
boom at the expense of low-income taxpayers is misguided.216
7. Addressing Environmental and Infrastructure Concerns
Some critics of family friendly tax measures may worry not about a
burgeoning middle class but about burgeoning, period. They may argue
that an effort to stabilize the United States population level will result in
an excessive number of additional children who, through their
numerosity, will endanger the environment and strain infrastructure
already burdened by an aging population.217 Data from France, which
216. Furthermore, economists have found over the past decade that the birthrate among women
who receive welfare does not vary according to increases or decreases in welfare benefits. Theodore
Joyce, Robert Kaestner & Sanders Korenman, Welfare Reform and Non-Marital Fertility in the 1990s:
Evidence from Birth Records 3-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W9406, 2002),
available at http://nberl5.nber.org/papers/w94060 (surveying available literature and concluding that
studies of the effect of benefit changes on birthrate have proven inconclusive); see generally Melissa
Schettini Kearney, Is There an Effect of Incremental Welfare Benefits on Fertility Behavior? A Look at
the Family Cap, 39 J. HUM. RESOURCES 295 (2004) (demonstrating that vital statistics data reveal no
decline in birthrate in response to family benefit caps). It is logical to conclude, based on these findings,
that even if the family taxable unit were structured-to include a refundable credit, it would have no effect
on the fertility of the lowest income families. Such families, who traditionally have a higher birthrate
than the remainder of the population, simply may not view their relative lack of means as a disincentive
to childbearing. As a result, it makes little sense to extend to these families the removal of a
disincentive that they do not perceive as such when they might be better aided by assistance in another
form, such as school choice vouchers. It bears repeating that I am not arguing that low-income families
would not benefit from added financial assistance. I am simply stating that added financial assistance is
unlikely to increase the birth rate among these families.
217. See Gary S. Becker, Missing Children, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2006, at A14 (stating that those
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has adopted more drastically liberal policies than the one suggested here,
indicate that the family taxable unit, standing alone or in combination
with other measures, will not cause a population boom but will merely
slow population decline.218 Furthermore, the provision is self-limiting.
The benefit decreases as a percentage of income with each additional
child, and once a family has reached the lowest tax bracket, splitting
income among additional children will have no effect. As a
consequence, the provision is not likely to encourage limitless visits
from the stork. Also, it should be noted that additional children will
someday become adults whose aggregate net benefit to society will
likely outweigh the extra cost, if any, that their upbringing imposes on
mature taxpayers. In other words, the family taxable unit should pay for
itself, even if it results in the highly unlikely need for additional
infrastructure.
VII. THE FRENCH EXAMPLE
As a partial response to the various criticisms presented above, the
following paragraphs describe tax treatment of families in France. The
country has always been a trendsetter in family policy, and it provides a
useful illustration of how the family taxable unit might function in
practice in combination with other measures.219 Unlike the United
States and its European neighbors, France did not seek to restore the
place of women to the home after World War 11.220 Neither did it
dissuade them from returning home.22 1 It was the first country to offer
paid maternity leave, and it has been on the forefront of providing
concerned about environmental pressure resulting from increased population have overlooked the fact
that younger, denser populations are more innovative and therefore less likely, as a result of better
technology, to stress the environment).
218. LONGMAN, supra note 5, at 30.
219. France has a fascinating history of pro-natalism that extends back to the early twentieth
century. See Marie-Monique Huss, Pronatalism in the Inter-War Period in France, 25 J. CONTEMP.
HIST. 39 (1990). As a political movement during the period between the first and second world wars,
pro-natalism appealed to supporters of national defense, family-centered groups and moralistic groups.
Id. at 40. The idealogy enjoyed wide popularity, and many of the social programs that began during its
heyday serve as the foundation for France's current and generous system of family support. See
generally id. The idea was so well-accepted that the post-Vichy government devoted twenty-two
percent of the country's GNP to redistribution in favor of families. Id. at 64. See also Rachel Henneck,
Family Policy in the US, Japan, Germany, Italy and France: Parental Leave, Child Benefits/Family





98 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol.76
universal childcare outside of the home.222 It is, perhaps, some measure
of the country's reproductive success that it has attempted to disentangle
a woman's choice to have children from her choice to have a career.
While the two choices can, practically speaking, never be mutually
exclusive, they are much less intertwined in France than in countries
where family benefits are available only to specified classes of mothers,
such as low-income women or women whose income enables them to
presently purchase childcare now in exchange for future tax relief.
Although France's benefits are extensive and would likely be frowned
upon in the United States as the beginning of a "nanny state," they are
an example of how the family taxable unit might work in tandem with
other measures that are beyond the scope of this Article. The French
allowances and incentives can be divided into three categories: those
that compensate for time pressure, those that compensate for wage
pressure, and use of the family unit as the taxable unit.
1. Allowances to Compensate for Time Pressure
France first introduced paid maternity leave in 1913.223 Since then,
the government has expanded its scope, and unlike many other
countries, France has mandatory job-protected, paid leave for parents
following birth of a child.224 Following maternity leave, children are
entitled to full-day child care, and all French children are enrolled in
preschool activities at ages three and four.225 Parents of limited means
are charged for these services on a sliding scale based on ability to
pay.226 Parents are also entitled to a tax credit equal to 25% of the costs
of outside child care up to £575 per child for as many as six children.227
In addition, France offers a tax credit equal to 50% of the amount paid
for au pair and housecleaning services up to C5,000.228 Finally, if a
parent chooses not to return to work following parental leave and the
birth of a child, he or she may collect the Allocation Parentale
d'Education, discussed below.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 9.
224. Id. at 10. Women take six weeks of leave before and ten weeks of leave after the births of
their first two children. Id. They take eight weeks of leave before and eighteen weeks of leave after the
birth of their third child. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 184, at 219.
228. Id.
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2. Allowances to Compensate for Wage Pressure
The Allocation Parentale d'Education grants one of a newborn's
parents a monthly benefit payment of approximately €500 for three
years following the child's birth, but only if the receiving parent has
held a job for two of the five years prior to birth and does not work more
than one-fifth of his or her normal hours while receiving the credit.229
The benefit was initially offered only to families with three or more
children, but in 1994, it was extended to families upon the birth of their
second child. 230  In addition, France offers a means-tested family
allowance to families with at least two children. This allowance is
available to families whose income does not exceed 55% of the
minimum wage.231 The obvious advantage of the Allocation Parentale is
that it allows earners to respond to time pressure by alleviating wage
pressure.
3. Family Taxable Unit
France provides an interesting example of how the family taxable unit
might work as part of a package of measures designed to stabilize the
population level. The family taxable unit was instituted in France just
after WWII to account for the effect of each family member's
consumption on the family's bottom line.232 The unit is called the
"foyer fiscal," and it consists of a husband and wife (or unmarried
partners who are bound by a civil pact and who have lived together for
at least three years) as well as dependent children and qualified disabled
persons who live in the same household.233 Under this system, the
incomes of all of the members of the household are aggregated, and
229. Guy Laroque & Bernard Salanie, Fertility and Financial Incentives in France (Ctr. for
Research in Econ. and Statistics, Working Paper No. 2003-32, 2003), available at
http://www.crest.fr/pageperso/lma/laroque/fec3e.pdf; Reinstadler et al., supra note 82, at 551.
230. Reinstadler et al., supra note 82, at 551.
231. 1d.at516.
232. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 184, at 263. France has a fascinating history of pro-natalism
that extends back to the early twentieth century. See Huss, supra note 219.
233. Id. The pact de civil solidarite joins unmarried partners of any sex. Id. Enacted in 1999, the
pact allows couples to determine their own property relations by contract, and couples are treated as
partners for social security purposes. Henneck, supra note 219, at 11. In my opinion, this arrangement
benefits society by rendering at least one aspect of the system of taxation marriage-neutral, something
that should be considered in the United States as a compromise between supporters and opponents of
gay marriage. The idea is a good one because it permits the federal government to administer laws on a
non-prejudicial basis while leaving moral questions to the states. On a pure policy level, if adoption of
the household as the taxable unit is predicated upon a correlation between increased consumption and
increased household size, marital status should not play a role in determining the amount of tax owed by
a household.
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income tax is then determined according to the "quotient familial. 234
To calculate the quotient familial, each spouse or civil partner is given a
value of one share.235 The household is given an addition half share for
the first two dependents, and a full share for any additional
dependents. 236 A household with a mother, father and two children, for
example, would have a quotient familial of three.237 If the family
decided to have another child, its quotient familial would increase to
four.238 Single parents receive an additional half share if they are the
primary caregiver of at least one child. 239 Finally, when two unmarried
parents who are not joined by civil pact share responsibility for a child,
each parent is entitled to only half of the child's share.24 °
In order to determine income tax, a family's aggregate income is
divided by its quotient familial.24' That product is compared to the rate
structure, which will contain four brackets ranging from 5.5% to 40% in
2007.242 The resulting tax is multiplied by the number of shares
attributed to the family.243 An identical rate structure applies to single
persons and to families. 24 Finally, tax savings generated by dependents
are limited by a ceiling, which was enacted to address concerns that the
quotient familial nullified progressivity at high income levels.245
It is worth mentioning at this point that France's income tax, despite
its high rate, accounts for only a quarter of all French tax revenue.246
The value-added tax generates a lion's share of the country's revenue.247
The country also imposes flat taxes on income that use the individual as
the taxable unit rather than the family. 248 The combined rate of these
taxes in 2004 was 8% of income.249 Because the United States relies
mainly upon the income tax to generate revenue, whereas France relies








242. Lawrence J. Speer, France Will Accelerate Income Tax Reductions Planned for End of 2007,
Daily Tax Rep.,(BNA) No. 182, at G3 (Sept. 20, 2006).
243. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 184, at 263.
244. Lari, supra note 117, at 231.
245. Id. at 237.
246. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 184, at 41 (noting that total tax revenues equal roughly 45% of
France's GDP and that income tax revenues equal roughly 11% of the GDP).
247. Lari, supra note 117, at 231.
248. Id. at 231.
249. AULT & ARNOLD, supra note 184, at 40.
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on supplementary taxes, a switch to the family taxable unit could be
perceived as a greater immediate fiscal threat in the United States. A
full exploration of the issue is beyond the scope of this Article;
nevertheless, as explained above, the United States rate structures
applicable to the family taxable unit would have to be considered
carefully prior to adoption.
Have France's policies helped it maintain a stable population?
Although no study has isolated the cause of France's robust population,
the country boasts one of the strongest birthrates in Europe. While its
neighbors face the threat of population decline, France's total fertility
rate remains close to the replacement rate.25° In 2006, it was 2.0
children per woman. 251 And the country's good showing cannot be
attributed to immigration. According to Michael Charpin, the director of
the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, the fertility of
France's immigrant population is only slightly higher than that of the
native-born population.252 Cultural factors undoubtedly play a role in
France's childbearing success, but it is highly unlikely that the country's
birthrate is not influenced by its family-forward policies. After all, close
neighbors Italy and Germany are both struggling to maintain stable
populations while France enjoys relative calm.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, Professor David Bradford
recognized the dynamic nature of the family as an economic unit and its
integral role in questions of taxation.253 He wrote that sharing of
consumption and resources within families justified use of the family as
"the unit of comparison." 254 He also wrote that familial differences are
''relevant to that comparison of lifetime situation by which relative tax
burdens are to be assigned to different individuals. The practical
consequence of this will be that the tax liability of a father, for example,
will depend in part upon consideration of the situation of the whole
family."
255
This statement is as true today as it was in 1977, when Blueprints was
first published. The difference is that in 1977, although global fertility
250. WATrENBERG, supra note 1, at 210. Some, but not all of its success is due to the continued
fertility of the second and third generation of the descendents of immigrants.
251. Pierre Yves-Roger, In France, a Modest Rebound for Babies, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2007, at
§1, 10.
252. Id.
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was firmly in the middle of a four-decade long decline, fear of
overpopulation was widespread. 6  Today, the concern is different.
Europe, Asia, and Australia are faced with depopulation, not
overpopulation.257 In order to maintain a stable population level in the
United States, the government should consider measures that would aid
families who want an additional child but who feel constrained by time
pressure, wage pressure, or both. The family taxable unit is one such
measure, and its adoption would bring conceptual coherence to the
Internal Revenue Code. The Code already contains a number of
provisions that treat the family as an economic unit. Taxpayers are
nonetheless barred from aggregating and splitting income with anyone
other than a spouse. Including children in the equation is not a departure
from established policy-it is merely a logical extension and
continuation of Congress's existing recognition of the family's shared
economic experience.
In addition to consistently expressing recognition of families'
financial interdependence, the family taxable unit does not incentivize
women to consider non-preference choices in market labor and child
care. The benefit is neutral with regard to the workplace participation of
secondary earners. It neither encourages nor discourages them from
entering the workforce. And in contrast to current tax breaks for the
purchase of childcare, adoption of the family taxable unit would not
implicitly express a governmental preference for working mothers. This
benefit neutrality is important because it prevents further stigmatization
of housework and leaves women free to choose the level of labor market
participation that most closely matches their preferences.
In addition to expressing a preference for working mothers, current
childcare benefits also express a preference for certain kinds of care. In
contrast, the family taxable unit does not. By providing an uncordoned
benefit, the family taxable unit would aid families whose childcare
preferences fall outside of Congress's prescription, thereby allowing
them greater autonomy. The benefit therefore allows families to
maximize their utility, something that a tailored credit or deduction
could not accomplish in every instance. 258 Whereas a two-earner family
might need additional funds to pay for childcare, a family with a stay-at-
home mom who has college education loans might desperately need
additional funds to pay for a fence or a safer car. The family taxable
256. Nicholas Eberstadt, Population, Resources, and the Quest to "Stabilize Human Population ":
Myths and Realities, in GLOBAL WARMING AND OTHER Eco-MYTHs 61, 62-63 (Ronald Bailey ed.,
2002).
257. WATTENBERG, supra note 1, at 137.
258. Whether they would do so or not is, of course, a separate question.
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unit helps both families. As they choose to grow, and as the economy
grows, the benefit provided by the family taxable unit grows with them.
Finally, France's experience with the family taxable unit
demonstrates that it will not, as some predict, result in an infrastructure-
busting, environment-ravaging baby boom. Instead, it may provide a
needed boost for families who desire, and are on the cusp of affording,
an additional child. Because it could tender such needed aid while
bringing holistic coherence and more freedom of choice to our current
system of family taxation, it is time that we gave the family taxable unit
a second look.
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